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WANBERG V. WANBERG:
CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE
OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wanberg v. Wanberg, I the Alaska Supreme Court held that
where one spouse actively participates in the ongoing maintenance,
management, and control of property acquired by the other spouse
prior to marriage, that property must be subject to equitable distri-
bution upon divorce. This note analyzes the impact of Wanberg on
the determination of what property is subject to equitable distribu-
tion in Alaska divorce proceedings. First, equitable distribution in
Alaska is discussed. Second, Wanberg is analyzed in light of four
alternative methods to interpret the Alaska equitable distribution
statute. The ramifications of treating separate property as marital
property, based on a judicial inference of the parties' intentions, are
then discussed. In conclusion, recommendations are offered which
would limit the impact of Wanberg.
II. BACKGROUND ON EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN ALASKA
"Equitable distribution" refers to the division of property upon
divorce based on the court's determination of what is equitable.2
Alaska statutory law formerly provided for equitable distribution
without regard to when or how the property was acquired.3 Alaska
Statute section 56-5-13 orginally provided:
Whenever a marriage shall be declared void or dissolved the
court shall have power to further decree as follows...
Sixth. For the division between the parties of their joint
Copyright © 1984 by Alaska Law Review
1. 664 P.2d 568 (Alaska 1983).
2. L. KORNFELD & M. KRANZ, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION: AN UPDATE 3
(1982).
3. ALASKA STAT. § 56-5-13 (1949) (amended 1968) (subsequently renumbered
§ 9.55.210(6); current version at § 25.24.160(6) (effective 1983)).
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property or the separate property of each, in such manner as may
be just, and without regard as to which of the parties is the owner
of such property.. . .4
In Merrill v. Merrill, 5 the Alaska Supreme Court set out the principal
factors for trial courts to consider in reaching a "just" division:
the respective ages of the parties; their earning ability; the dura-
tion [of the marriage] and conduct of each during the marriage;
[the parties'] station in life; the circumstances and necessities of
each; their health and physical condition; their financial circum-
stances, including the time and manner of acquisition of the prop-
erty in question, its value at the time and its income producing
capacity if any.
Thus, property acquired prior to marriage, or during the marriage
but by gift, inheritance, or in exchange for previously owned prop-
erty was available for distribution. The time and manner of acquisi-
tion, however, influenced whether such property would be
distributed and, if so, how it would be divided.
Trial courts were given much discretion in dividing property:
the division would stand unless it was "clearly unjust."' 6 As a result,
no clear pattern emerged concerning the division of property ac-
quired by one party prior to marriage. 7 In McSmith v. McSmith, 8
the Alaska Supreme Court upheld a property division in which the
trial court divided equally the parties' marital property after al-
lowing set-offs for their nonmarital property. That same year, how-
ever, the court emphasized in Crume v. Crume9 that Alaska law did
not distinguish between assets acquired prior to marriage and those
subsequently acquired.
In 1968, the equitable distribution provision was amended to
read:
In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a
marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may pro-
vide...
(6) for the division between the parties of their property,
whether joint or separate, acquired only during coverture, in the
manner as may be just, and without regard to which of the parties
is in fault; however, the court, in making the division, may invade
the property of either spouse acquired before marriage when the
4. Id
5. 368 P.2d 546, 547-48 n.4 (Alaska 1962).
6. Id at 547;see Crume v. Crume, 378 P.2d 183, 186 (Alaska 1963); Rhodes v.
Rhodes, 370 P.2d 902, 905 (Alaska 1962).
7. For purposes of this note, "marital property" will refer to property acquired
during the marriage and "nonmarital property" will refer to all other property
owned by the parties.
8. 387 P.2d 454, 455 (Alaska 1963).
9. 378 P.2d 183, 186 (Alaska 1963).
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balancing of the equities between the parties requires it .... lO
By distinguishing between property acquired during marriage and
that previously acquired, Alaska joined a number of states which
based equitable distribution on this distinction." Many non-com-
munity property states follow the community property rule that al-
lows division only of property acquired during the marriage,
whether joint or separate, except (1) property acquired by gift, be-
quest, or inheritance, (2) property acquired in exchange therefor, (3)
property acquired before marriage and its increase, and (4) property
excluded by a valid separation agreement of the parties.' 2 In these
states and in Alaska, the time of acquisition is the principal factor in
determining what property is subject to equitable division.
Although the Alaska statute initially provides only for the divi-
sion of property acquired after marriage, it also provides for the in-
vasion of property previously acquired "when the balancing of the
equities between the parties requires it." This "invasion clause" was
first interpreted by the Alaska Supreme Court in Vanover v. Va-
nover. 13 In Vanover, the court held that the 1968 amendment to
Alaska Statute section 25.24.160(6) did not circumscribe the broad
discretion regarding property division previously afforded trial
courts. 14 The validity of the Merrill factors' 5 as guidelines for equi-
tably dividing marital property was also reaffirmed. 16 The Vanover
court then set out the following factors for determining whether to
invade nonmarital assets: the duration of the marriage, the parties'
conduct during the marriage, the manner in which the property was
acquired, the value of the property when acquired and at present,
and any other equitable factors indicating that the spouses should
share in that property. 17
The court held that invasion of the husband's nonrmarital prop-
erty was appropriate in Vanover because the wife's monetary contri-
butions toward family expenses and taxes had enabled the husband
to retain his nonmarital property. 18 The fact that the husband's
nonmarital property had greatly appreciated during the marriage
10. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (1983).
11. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1964
& Supp. 1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330 (1977 & Supp. 1981).
12. See generally Freed, Equitable Distribution as of December 1982, 9 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) No. 1, 4001, 4002 (Jan. 11, 1983) (categorizing states according to meth-
ods of property characterization and distribution).
13. 496 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1972).
14. Id at 648.
15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
16. Vanover, 496 P.2d at 648.
17. Id
18. Id at 647.
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while the wife's had not appreciated also influenced the court.' 9 The
court held:
Where one spouse has made contributions to the marital commu-
nity, whether of a pecuniary or of a more intangible nature, and
where these contributions have benefited in any manner the sepa-
rate property of the other spouse acquired before marriage, we
believe that the trial court may determine that all or a portion of
that property should be included with the property acquired after
marriage in effecting a just and equitable division of property. 20
In subsequent cases, the Alaska Supreme Court followed Va-
nover by analyzing one spouse's contributions to both marital and
specific nonmarital property and then requiring invasion of the
nonmarital property.21 However, no clear analytical pattern devel-
oped in cases involving nonmarital property. In some cases, general
equitable considerations such as age, health, and employment his-
tory were cited to support invasion of specific nonmarital property. 22
In Courtney v. Courtney, 23 however, invasion was discussed in terms
of the value of both marital and nonmarital property, rather than by
focusing on equitable concerns. The court initially set out the value
of the parties' total property.24 It then subtracted the value of the
husband's nonmarital property at the time of the marriage. The dif-
ference was divided equally between the parties. An existing debt
incurred during marriage was imposed upon the husband; this gave
him a lower net amount than that awarded the wife. The court held
that such an imposition did not constitute invasion because the hus-
band had been awarded a sum greater than the value of the property
he brought into the marriage.25 The approach in Courtney contrasts
with the Vanover analysis which based invasion on the other
spouse's contributions to the nonmarital property or upon more gen-
eral equitable considerations, regardless of the initial division of
marital property.
The statutory distinction between marital and nonmarital prop-
erty was practically ignored by the Alaska Supreme Court in
19. Id
20. Id at 648.
21. See Moore v. Moore, 499 P.2d 300, 304 (Alaska 1972) (wife's contributions
of earnings, labor, and housekeeping services); Ross v. Ross, 496 P.2d 662, 665
(Alaska 1972) (husband's contributions of money and labor).
22. See Hager v. Hager, 553 P.2d 919, 924 (Alaska 1976); Courtney v. Courtney,
542 P.2d 164, 169 (Alaska 1975) (alternative holding); Burrell v. Burrell, 537 P.2d 1,
6 (Alaska 1975).
23. 542 P.2d 164, 168 (Alaska 1975).
24. In Courtney, the trial court had previously awarded to the husband his spe-
cific nonmarital property. However, the supreme court focused on property values
rather than ownership of specific property. Id
25. Id
[Vol. 1: 143
EQUITABLE DISTRIB UTION
Hinchey v. Hinchey26 and Rosson v. Rosson. 27 In both cases, the
court deferred to the trial court's discretion in dividing specific prop-
erty. Characterization of the property as either marital or nonmarital
was brushed aside. Instead, the supreme court reasoned that the trial
court had the discretion to divide the property despite its characteri-
zation. Only a cursory mention of equitable considerations support-
ing invasion was made in each case.28
In sum, although the Alaska equitable distribution statute
clearly distinguishes between types of property according to the time
of acquisition, the Alaska courts have not handled this distinction in
a predictable manner. Decisions to invade nonmarital property have
been based on general equitable considerations, equitable factors
specific to that property, or a value approach based on the inability
of marital property alone to satisfy the equities. At times, the Alaska
court has even rejected the legislative pronouncement by implying
that the distinction between marital and nonmarital property is
unimportant.
III. WANBERG V. WANBERG
A. Facts and Holding
The Alaska Supreme Court's recent decision in Wanberg v.
Wanberg29 illustrates the court's tendency to blur the line between
marital and nonmarital property. In Wanberg, the court required
invasion of specific nonmarital property as a matter of law. This
holding was based on the judicially inferred intent of the parties.30
The parties in Wanberg had obtained a divorce after five and
one-half years of marriage. The husband's net worth at the time of
the marriage was calculated as $366,000 and the wife's was $38,000.
The estate was valued at $704,450 at the time of the divorce; $57,500
of which was awarded to the wife. On appeal, she challenged the
trial court's failure to classify specific property as marital. She also
argued that certain nonmarital assets should have been invaded be-
cause the parties had treated those assets as joint holdings.3'
The court decided whether specific properties were available for
equitable distribution. The court first examined real estate holdings
owned by the husband prior to marriage upon which the parties had,
after their marriage, constructed a five unit apartment building. The
couple had lived in one of these units for two years. They had ob-
26. 625 P.2d 297 (Alaska 1981).
27. 635 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1981).
28. See Rosson, 635 P.2d at 471; Hinchey, 625 P.2d at 304.
29. 664 P.2d 568 (Alaska 1983).
30. Id at 571.
31. Id at 570.
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tained a $120,000 loan on the building in their joint names. The wife
had participated in making design and alteration decisions concern-
ing the building. She had also cleaned, advertised and shown the
units, entertained prospective tenants, and collected rent money.
The trial court had treated only the appreciation resulting from
property improvements as an asset subject to equitable distribution.
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the entire equitable value of
the property and apartment building was divisible. 32 The supreme
court also held that another commercial building owned by the hus-
band prior to marriage was divisible, because the wife had signifi-
cantly participated in the ongoing business affairs involving that
property.33 Another nonmarital commercial property was not in-
vaded because the wife had not significantly contributed to its man-
agement.3 4 Two other assets were classified as marital by the court
because they were acquired during the marriage.35
In Wanberg, the court articulated a three-step approach for eq-
uitable division: (1) determine what property is available for distri-
bution, (2) find the value of that property, and (3) decide how to
equitably apportion the property. The question whether to invade
specific property was addressed in the first step. The court held:
In limited circumstances invasion of one spouse's property ac-
quired before coverture may be required as a matter of law. One
such circumstance is where the parties, by their actions during the
marriage, demonstrate their intention to treat specific items of
property as joint holdings .... Such intention is manifest when
both spouses can be shown to have taken an interest in the ongo-
ing maintenance, management, and control of specific assets.
Where such circumstances exist, basic fairness requires that prop-
erty treated by the spouses as jointly held be available for equita-
ble division .... 3?
Nonmarital property was effectively characterized as marital for pur-
poses of property division. The actual allocation was left to the trial
court's discretion, using the Merrill factors as a guide.37 By treating
nonmarital property as marital and by failing to provide a strict eq-
uitable standard for dividing that property, the Wanberg court fur-
32. Id at 572.
33. Id at 573.
34. Id
35. Id at 573-74. The husband argued that one of these assets, an airplane,
should have been classified as nonmarital because it was purchased with proceeds
from the sale of another airplane he owned prior to marriage. The court rejected
this argument, basing its holding on a literal interpretation of the "acquired...
during coverture" language of ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(6) (1983) and on the fact
that the new airplane had been purchased nine months before the sale of the old
one. 664 P.2d at 574.
36. 664 P.2d at 571 (footnotes omitted).
37. Id at 574.
[Vol. 1: 143
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
ther eroded the statutory distinction between marital and nonmarital
property.
B. Alternative Approaches
Wanberg concerned the distribution of one spouse's nonmarital
property to which the other spouse had contributed significant time
and labor. A court might take one of four analytical approaches for
characterizing such property for the purpose of equitable distribu-
tion under the Alaska statute.
First, the court might wholly ignore the statutory distinction be-
tween marital and nonmarital property. The Alaska Supreme Court
verged upon this approach in Hinchey38 when it reasoned that char-
acterizing certain property as marital or nonmarital was unnecessary
because the trial court had discretion to reach both kinds of prop-
erty. The suggestion in Wanberg that identical standards might ap-
ply to the division of marital and the invasion of nonmarital
property could also be interpreted as taking this approach.39 This
analysis conflicts with the statutory provision for equitable distribu-
tion which clearly contemplates different treatment of the two prop-
erty categories.4° The 1968 amendment created this distinction so
that only marital property would be distributed, except under special
circumstances. 4'
A second possible approach to the Wanberg facts would trans-
mute the entire property from nonmarital into marital property. The
Supreme Court of Illinois took this approach in In re Marriage of
Smith. 42 In Smith, the Illinois court held that the commingling of
one spouse's nonmarital property with either marital property or
nonmarital property of the other spouse created a presumption of
transmutation. 43 The court inferred an intent to treat the property as
marital because marital funds were used to improve nonmarital
property.44 Illinois law provided for the distribution of marital prop-
erty. after excepting each spouse's nonmarital property.45 One
spouse's contribution to the acquisition, preservation, depreciation,
38. 625 P.2d at 304; see also Rosson, 635 P.2d at 471.
39. 664 P.2d at 574.
40. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(6) (1983) (distinguishing between property
"acquired only during coverture" and that "acquired before marriage").
41. Judiciary Comm. Report on Comm Substitute for House Bill No. 247, 5th
Legisl., 1st Sess. (Mar. 22, 1967).
42. 86 M11. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981).
43. Id at 529, 427 N.E.2d at 1244.
44. Id at 531, 427 N.E.2d at 1245. But cf. In re Marriage of Cook, 9 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2672, 2673 (Il. 1983) (wife's use of marital telephone for her
nonmarital business transactions did not create presumption of transmutation).
45. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(d) (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1981).
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or appreciation of the other's nonmarital property is considered in
allocating the marital property.46
The Wanberg decision is analagous to a transmutation ap-
proach because the court focused on the parties' treatment of the
property as a joint holding. By inferring that the intent of the couple
was to treat the property as joint property, the court required inva-
sion - treating the nonmarital property as though it were marital.47
The time of acquisition was to influence the actual division of the
property, not its characterization. 48
Many states transmute nonmarital property into marital prop-
erty when title to it is transferred from single to joint ownership.49
The transfer creates the presumption of a gift to the marital estate.50
This presumption can be overcome, however, by a written agreement
or by clear evidence of a contrary intent.5'
The transmutation approach circumvents Alaska's statutory
characterization of property according to the time of acquisition.
The statutory language could be reconciled with the transmutation
approach by adopting the presumption of a gift from one spouse to
the marital estate; thus, the property would have been "acquired" by
the marital estate. However, this approach endangers a married per-
son's ability to retain separate property. When property has been
transferred from single to joint ownership, a clear affirmative act has
been taken and the intent is clear. But when property characteriza-
tion turns on factual questions of a spouse's contributions and sub-
jective inferences of intent, as it did in Wanberg, uncertainty results.
Treating the property as part marital and part nonmarital is a
third possible approach to Wanberg. This hybrid approach is com-
parable to the "source of funds" theory adopted by some states. 52
Under the "source of funds" theory, when property is acquired with
both marital anid nonmarital funds, it retains this dual character.
Upon divorce, the marital estate is reimbursed for a proportionate
46. Id § 503(d)(1).
47. Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 571.
48. Id at 574.
49. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 815, 614 P.2d 285, 289,
166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857 (1980); Smith, 86 I1. 2d at 522, 427 N.E.2d at 1244; Carter v.
Carter, 419 A.2d 1018, 1022 (Me. 1980). But e Hemily v. Hemily, 403 A.2d 1139,
1143 (D.C. 1979) (no transmutation from marital to nonmarital when husband con-
veyed his interest to wife who then became sole title holder).
50. Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018, 1021 (Me. 1980).
51. See In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 816, 614 P.2d 285, 289, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 853, 857 (1980); Coates v. Coates, 64 I11. App. 3d 914, 916-17, 381 N.E.2d
1200, 1203 (1978).
52. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179, 1181 (Me. 1983); Harper v. Harper,
294 Md. 54, 80, 448 A.2d 916, 929 (1982).
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share of its investment from the enhanced value of the property.5 3
This theory has also been applied when marital funds were used to
improve nonmarital property54 and when marital contributions con-
sisted of the other spouse's services.5 5 The statutory definition of
marital property as that acquired during marriage has been recon-
ciled with the theory by interpreting "acquisition" as an ongoing
process which is not dependent on the passage of title.5 6
Alternatively, the property could be characterized as nonmarital
but subject to a lien held by the marital estate proportionate to the
enhanced value resulting from marital contributions.5 7 This alterna-
tive focuses on the increase in value due to marital contributions.
Often, the contributions consist of expenditures for mortgage pay-
ments or improvements.5 8 Some states also reimburse the marital
estate for appreciation in marital property based on the indirect con-
tributions by the homemaker spouse.5 9
In Wanberg, the Alaska Supreme Court overturned the trial
court's award of one-half of the appreciation in nonmarital property
to the wife. The court held that the value of the entire property was
subject to equitable distribution because of the parties' joint manage-
ment efforts.60 The hybrid "source of funds" approach contrasts
with the Alaska court's characterization of the entire property in
Wanberg as marital. The court left open the possibility, however,
that the trial court could base the actual division of property on the
extent of the wife's contributions to the husband's nonmarital
property.6 1
A fourth approach to Wanberg focuses on equitable concerns.
Under this approach the property would retain a nonmarital charac-
ter if it were not purchased during marriage. However, the fact that
one spouse's contributions enhanced the value of the other's
nonmarital property would be considered in fairly dividing the mari-
tal property.62 Nonmarital property would be invaded only if the
court were unable to satisfy the equities through an allocation of
marital property.
53. Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Me. 1983).
54. Id
55. Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 82, 448 A.2d 916, 930 (1982).
56. See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 77 (Me. 1979).
57. See Baker v. Baker, 80 Wash. 2d 736, 745, 498 P.2d 315, 321 (1972).
58. See In re Marriage of Johnson, 28 Wash. App. 574, 576, 625 P.2d 720, 720
(1981).
59. See Griffith v. Griffith, 185 N.J. Super. 382, 385, 448 A.2d 1035, 1036 (Ch.
Div. 1982); Parrott v. Parrott, 278 S.C. 60, 63, 292 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1982).
60. Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 572.
61. Id
62. See Bentley v. Bentley, 84 11. 2d 97, 101, 417 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (1981);
Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
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The language of the Alaska statute suggests this type of ap-
proach.63 Further, Ross v. Ross64 supports this interpretation of the
statute. In Ross, the husband was awarded all of the marital property
and a portion of the wife's nonmarital property. The award was
based on his contributions of money and labor which enhanced the
value of his wife's property.65 Courtney v. Courtney,66 in which the
court held that no invasion occurred when the husband was awarded
an amount greater than his net worth prior to marriage, also sup-
ports this approach.
In Wanberg, however, the court analyzed the equities involving
the treatment of specific property in characterizing that property as
distributable. Alternatively, the court could have reserved its deci-
sion concerning the appropriateness of invasion until it determined
whether all the equities could have been satisfied through a distribu-
tion of the marital property. By adjusting for the equities more
broadly rather than within each item of property, the court could
have equitably accounted for the wife's contributions without forc-
ing a sale or division of the husband's separate property.
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPERTY FOR EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION AFTER Wanberg
The Alaska Supreme Court's tendency to blur the line between
marital and nonmarital property creates problems for a married per-
son wishing to maintain separate property. Because implied inten-
tions may effectively transform nonmarital property into marital
property, any improvements to, use of, or maintenance of,
nonmarital property may transform it into marital property. Uncer-
tainty about what conduct constitutes an intent to treat property as a
joint holding could inhibit dealings with nonmarital property.
A number of questions involving property characterization re-
main unanswered under Alaska law. After Wanberg, the act of
transferring title from single to joint ownership will certainly subject
property to equitable distribution as a joint holding. Taking out a
joint mortgage on property titled in one spouse's name should have
the same effect.67 The impact of exchanging nonmarital property for
other property during the marriage remains uncertain. In Wanberg,
the husband argued that an airplane purchased during the marriage
63. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(6) (1983) (providing for invasion of property
acquired before marriage "when the balancing of the equities between the parties
requires it").
64. 496 P.2d 662 (Alaska 1972).
65. Id at 665.
66. 542 P.2d 164, 168 (Alaska 1975).
67. See Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 572.
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was nonmarital property because it had been purchased with pro-
ceeds from the sale of an airplane he owned prior to marriage. The
court rejected this argument, basing its holding on two factors: first,
the fact that the old airplane was not sold until nine months after the
new one was purchased; and second, the literal statutory language
defining marital property as "acquired . . . during coverture.
68
Given the court's unwillingness to apply the statute literally in treat-
ing the commercial properties owned by the husband prior to mar-
riage as marital property, the timing factor may have been
determinative on the exchange issue. If so, a nearly simultaneous
exchange of nonmarital property for similar property during the
marriage may not result in characterization of that property as
marital.
The Alaska Supreme Court has not addressed the question of
characterizing property obtained during marriage by gift, bequest, or
inheritance. In Burrell v. Burrel,69 the court held that inherited
property was distributable. However, the court explicitly avoided
deciding whether inherited property was marital or nonmarital.
70
The statutory language suggests that such property should be charac-
terized as marital. Under Merrill v. Merrill7 l the manner of acquisi-
tion would then influence how the marital property would be
distributed.
Characterization of the appreciation of nonmarital property
also remains uncertain under Alaska law. In Hinchey v. Hinchey,
72
the court held that business property was distributable when the ma-
jority of its appreciation occurred after marriage. The court declined
to characterize the property as either marital or nonmarital.73 Ap-
preciation of nonmarital property resulting purely from inflation or
market conditions may remain nonmarital.74 If such appreciation
results from spousal contributions, however, an Alaska court may
subject the entire property to equitable distribution depending on the
nature and extent of the contributions.75
In Wanberg, the court required invasion of nonmartial property
"where the parties, by their actions during marriage, demonstrate
their intention to treat specific items of property as joint holdings.
This language could be extended beyond the Wanberg facts to cases
68. Id at 574.
69. 537 P.2d 1 (1975).
70. Id at 6 n.15.
71. 368 P.2d 546, 547 n.4 (Alaska 1962).
72. 625 P.2d 297, 304 (Alaska 1981).
73. Id
74. See Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J. Super. 5, 7, 370 A.2d 509, 510 (App. Div. 1977).
75. See Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 572.
76. Id at 571.
1984]
ALASK4 LAW REVIEW
where the couple uses marital funds or funds of the nonowner
spouse to improve or maintain nonmarital property.77 Also, joint
use of property may trigger invasion. Even the other spouse's indi-
rect contributions could support an extension of Wanberg. In both
Moore v. Moore78 and Vanover v. Vanover,79 the wife's monetary
contributions toward family expenses, which enabled the husband to
maintain his separate property, supported the decision to invade the
husband's property. The court also recognized the wife's indirect
contributions as a homemaker in Moore. 80 Such expansions of Wan-
berg could vitiate the statutory distinction between marital and
nonmarital property.
V. CONCLUSION
Married persons wishing to preserve their nonmarital property
must be careful in their dealings with such property. For example,
segregated funds should be used for maintenance on and improve-
ments to nonmarital property to rebut any inference that the prop-
erty is considered by the parties to be a joint holding. Any joint
expenditures for the property should be reimbursed from separate
funds. If one spouse contributes labor to benefit the other spouse's
nonmarital property, a salary might be paid for such work. Execu-
tion of a written agreement may also effectively maintain the status
of nonmarital property. Such an agreement must be executed volun-
tarily, with knowledge of the extent of property affected, under con-
ditions evidencing no fraud or duress, and with conscionable
terms.81
The Wanberg holding should be limited in order to effectuate
the statutory distinction between marital and nonmarital property.
Certainly the court may compensate a spouse for his or her contribu-
tions to the nonmarital property of the other spouse. Compensation,
however, could be achieved in most cases by accounting for those
contributions in an equitable distribution of marital property. The
court should initially determine the value of the property acquired
during marriage and allocate this property by considering all rele-
77. See In re Marriage of Smith, 86 M1l. 2d 518, 531, 427 N.E.2d 1239, 1245
(1981).
78. 499 P.2d 300 (Alaska 1972).
79. 496 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1972).
80. 499 P.2d at 304; see also Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Alaska
1981).
81. See, e.g., Sanders v. Colwell, 248 Ga. 376, 377, 283 S.E.2d 461, 462 (1981);
In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wash. 2d 649, 654, 565 P.2d 790, 793 (1977); cf. Scher-
er v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 641, 292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1982) (antenuptial contract);
Hook v. Hook, 69 Ohio St. 2d 234, 236, 431 N.E.2d 667, 669 (1982) (antenuptial
contract).
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vant equitable factors. Nonmarital property should be invaded only
when marital property is insufficient for full compensation. By in-
vading nonmarital property only as a last resort, the court can satisfy
the equities while maintaining the integrity of nonmarital property
and satisfying the statutory language.
Karen B. Brumbaugh

